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Patterns of growth and stagnation in the
late nineteenth century Habsburg
economy
MAX-STEPHAN SCHULZE
Department of Economic History, London School of Economics, Houghton
Street, London WCA AE
This article addresses two issues that feature prominently in the recent
historiography. First, how does the Habsburg Empire’s economic
performance compare to the record for other European economies in
terms of levels and growth of national income? Second, to what extent
was the Austrian economy subject to prolonged stagnation after ?
These questions are examined on the basis of new annual estimates of
GDP for Austria and Hungary for  to . The article argues, first,
that over the whole period under review Austrian per capita income failed
to expand at a pace broadly commensurate with the country’s relative
income position. The Austrian economy did not catch up with the 
leaders and failed to keep pace with other ‘followers’. Second, the
Hungarian economy recorded a markedly higher rate of per capita income
growth, placing it about mid-range in a European growth comparison.
Third, the new evidence supports the notion of a ‘great depression’ in the
western half of the empire (Austria) after . The distinct periodicity
and differential rates of Austrian and Hungarian growth are consistent
with the argument that the outflow of Austrian capital to Hungary after
the  Vienna stock market crash was crucial in prolonging economic
stagnation in Austria, whilst fuelling the first widespread wave of
industrialisation in Hungary. The reversal of this capital outflow in the
early s was associated with an increase in Austrian economic growth
and a decrease in Hungary’s rate of expansion.
. Introduction
The Habsburg Empire, one of the largest economies on the European
Continent before , rarely features in comparative studies of long-run
growth for, it seems, two major reasons. First, the empire was dissolved in
the aftermath of the First World War and gave way to a multitude of suc-
cessor states. Consequently, the Habsburg economy cannot be included
readily in comparative data sets that encompass the twentieth century.
Second, much of Central and Eastern Europe lies in a ‘statistical dark age’
compared to Western Europe (Good ).
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This article presents new annual estimates of GDP for Austria and
Hungary for  to . These estimates are used to address two issues
that feature prominently in the recent historiography. First, how does the
Habsburg Empire’s economic performance compare to the record for other
European economies in terms of levels and growth of national income?
Williamson () argued recently that the late nineteenth century wit-
nessed a process of rapid growth and convergence in living standards, at
least among those countries that now form the OECD. Poor countries at
the European periphery tended to grow faster than the developed
economies at the centre and often even faster than the richer countries over-
seas in the New World, while most of the Third World and Eastern Europe
did not share in this experience. Placed somewhere midrange on the west-
east developmental gradient in Europe and displaying a similar pattern of
regional disparities within its own boundaries (Good ), where does the
Habsburg Empire fit in? Second, to what extent did the Austrian economy
experience prolonged stagnation after  (Komlos , März ,
Schulze )?
The first attempt at a systematic estimation of national income in the
Habsburg Empire and its two major subunits, imperial Austria
(Cisleithania) and imperial Hungary (Transleithania), was made during the
First World War (Fellner , Gürtler ). Subsequently, the dissolution
of the empire stimulated Fellner () and Waizner () to determine
pre-war income levels in the successor-state units. These calculations were
concerned solely with income levels in – and no attempt was made to
derive estimates for the nineteenth century. This early body of work was
taken up again by Eckstein () who estimated national income and cap-
ital formation in – for Hungary in its interwar boundaries to which
the country reverted after World War II. In the s, Nachum Gross in his
doctoral thesis on Austria’s industrialisation () re-worked Fellner’s
() and Waizner’s () material and complemented it by estimates for
earlier benchmark years. This marked the shift in emphasis from predomi-
nantly qualitative and descriptive work to quantitative-analytical research in
Habsburg economic history.
Much of the initial work in the new vein reflected the search for a major
Rostovian or Gerschenkronian economic discontinuity and has led to new
annual estimates of sectoral production. The most significant quantitative
contributions are the industrial and agricultural production indices of
Komlos (), which are on both methodological and empirical grounds
generally recognised as the best produced so far, and the detailed account
of Austrian agricultural production by Sandgruber (). Rudolph’s
() earlier calculations of industrial output are important in this context
primarily because they form an integral part of the one annual estimate of
Austrian national income that has been produced so far (Kausel ). Its
derivative, which refers to the territories of modern-day Austria, is included
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in the much used Maddison data sets (Maddison ). For Hungary, the
new GDP estimate presented here is the first annual series of national
income for the late nineteenth century. However, earlier attempts at meas-
uring aggregate growth have been made on the basis of estimates for two
benchmark years such as Katus’s () computation of Gross Domestic
Material Product for  and .
More recently, David Good adopted a Crafts-type structural equation
approach to estimate per capita income levels for five benchmark years in the
Habsburg Empire as a function of several proxy variables (Crafts ,
Good , , ; Good and Ma ). The main purpose of this
work is to estimate relative income levels of the regions and successor-state
territories of the Habsburg Empire. Yet it has also been used to assess the
relative growth performance of Austria-Hungary. The proxy approach may
be a feasible way to approximate output at regional levels for which stan-
dard national income measures cannot be computed because of the lack of
essential data. For theoretical and conceptual reasons, though, it does not
offer an alternative to the national income approach where that can be
employed (Maddison ; Pammer ).
The main comparator for the new estimates is those existing annual
estimates of GDP that build on standard national income methodology,
that is, Kausel (). For Hungary, no such comparable estimates exist.
Katus’s () figures do not permit an assessment of the phasing of aggre-
gate economic growth as they include only estimates for the very beginning
and the very end of the period under review. The re-estimation of GDP
involved the construction of new series for secondary sector output. Here,
the relevant comparison is with Komlos’s () indices for both Austria
and Hungary. Table  summarises the main results of research on the rate
of economic growth in the Habsburg Empire.
This article argues, first, that economic growth in the western half of the
empire (imperial Austria) failed by a significant margin to keep pace with
rates achieved in most other European economies. In terms of per capita
income growth, the Austrian economy was not catching up, but falling
behind in the late nineteenth century. Hungary, in contrast, recorded a
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 Pammer () argues that the procedure yields statistical artefacts in terms of both
absolute income levels and rates of income growth over time. He maintains that, first, the
income estimates are biased as a result of inappropriate functional specification of the
estimation equation and the application to relatively backward regions of coefficients
which were estimated on the basis of data for relatively advanced economies. Second,
individual country effects alter or offset the impact of variables generally associated with
income; hence they severely restrict the validity of using these proxy variables (such as
crude death rates, the share of the agricultural labour force, and letters posted) for
predicting income in other economies. Finally, he questions the validity of using proxy
variables that are not theoretically linked to GDP. See Good () and Good and Ma
() for a response and revised estimates.
higher than average rate of per capita income growth. Second, the new evi-
dence is more in tune with interpretations that postulate a marked slow-
down in Austrian economic activity during the s and s, the ‘Great
Depression’ (Komlos , ; März ; Schulze ), than with the
‘revisionist’ argument of almost uniform growth between  and 
(Good , , ). Third, the distinct periodicity and differential
rates of Austrian and Hungarian growth are consistent with the argument
that the outflow of Austrian capital to Hungary after the  Vienna stock
market crash was crucial in prolonging economic stagnation in Austria,
whilst fuelling the first widespread wave of industrialisation in Hungary
(Komlos ). The rest of the article is organised as follows: Section 
describes briefly the derivation of the new GDP estimates, with details on
methods and sources provided in the Appendix. Section  offers a com-
parison with earlier estimates of GDP and industrial production. Finally,
Section  summarises the results and points to some of their implications.
. Deriving GDP estimates for the Habsburg Empire
The new estimates of Austrian and Hungarian GDP in constant  prices
are based on eight sectoral series (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, con-
struction, handicrafts, trade and communications, public and private serv-
ices, housing). These output series and their constituent sub-series are
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 The estimates for ‘Austria’ refer to all Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Imperial
Council, those for ‘Hungary’ to all territories of the Hungarian crown (Hungary proper,
Fiume, Croatia-Slavonia). Bosnia-Hercegovina, occupied in  and annexed by
Austria-Hungary in , is not included in the estimates.
Table . Estimates of GDP per capita growth (per cent per annum).
– – –
Imperial Austria
Good () .a .b .c
Kausel () . . .
Good and Ma () . . .
New estimate . . .
Imperial Hungary
Katus () – – .d
Good and Ma () . . .
New estimate . . .
Habsburg Empire
Good and Ma () . . .
New estimate . . .
Notes: a/–/; b/–/; c/–/; dGDMP, –
Sources: Appendix, Tables A, A, for new estimates. References for other figures.
combined using constant  value added shares as weights.
Total gross value added (or GDP) for  and its sectoral components
are reconstructed on the basis of estimates by Fellner (; for Austrian
non-state regulated manufacturing, Hungarian manufacturing and handi-
crafts production), Gürtler (; for Hungarian agriculture), Katus (;
for Hungarian construction, trade, transport and communications), Kausel
(; for Austrian trade, transport and communications, public and pri-
vate services, housing), Komlos (; for Austrian and Hungarian mining),
and Waizner (; for Austrian agriculture, state regulated manufacturing,
construction, handicrafts). In addition, new estimates have been produced
for Austrian and Hungarian iron and steel production. Value added as
documented in Table  was projected backwards drawing on a broad range
of sector-specific output indices. The methods and sources used in the der-
ivation of these indices are set out in the Appendix.
. A comparison with earlier estimates of GDP and
industrial output
Kausel draws on Waizner’s estimates of net national income for /
which he projected backwards after rebasing them to  and conversion
into gross value added format. The main data sources for extrapolation are
Sandgruber () for agricultural production, an index of industrial output
compiled by Rudolph (), estimates of industrial production for several
census years and an approximation of national income for  made by
Gross (). Estimates for the tertiary sector are made largely on the basis
of material published in Brusatti (). However, virtually all of the sub-
stantial difference between Kausel’s results and the new GDP calculations
is due to the different data and methods used in estimating output in the
mining and secondary sectors.
Gross () has produced estimates of industrial output in current prices
for , , ,  and /, and deflated these using a German
wholesale price index. Rudolph (), in contrast, compiled a weighted
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 There are some minor exceptions to this rule. First, Sandgruber’s () index of output
of fieldcrops and wine, which forms the core of the estimate of agricultural production,
draws on average / quantities and prices as weights. Second, the new estimate of
construction output rests on a composite index which uses  weights derived from
Hoffmann (). Third, the value-added estimates for steel refining and electricity
generation are measured in  prices, and the estimate for petroleum output is given in
 prices.
 Many of the sectoral output data provided by Fellner (), Gürtler () and Waizner
() are either for single years between  and  or a period average over these
years. As a rule, their figures have been converted into  prices, relying on product-
specific price indices from Mühlpeck et al. () and rebased to  using branch-
specific production indices.
annual index based on volume indicators for five branches (mining, metal-
making, machine-building, food processing, textiles). For  to ,
Kausel ‘joined’ these two series in a not altogether transparent way such that
their mean rate of growth was taken to reflect the long-run rate of growth of
industrial production. Rudolph’s annual values were then incorporated into
this ‘frame’ by interpolation. The series so obtained was then used to proj-
ect backwards total value added in mining, manufacturing, handicrafts pro-
duction and construction. This procedure and the underlying estimates
entail several problems which severely impede the quality of Kausel’s
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Table . Composition of gross value added, .
Austria Hungary
m. K Share m. K Share
Fieldcrops, wine, vegetables ,. . ,. .
Fruit . . . .
Livestock ,. . ,. .
Forestry . . . .
Mining . . . .
Beer . . . .
Sugar . . . .
Tobacco . . . .
Spirits . . . .
Petroleum . . . .
Iron and steel . . . .
Mechanical engineering . . . .
Transport engineering . . . .
Electrical engineering . . . .
Instruments and apparatus . . # #
Metal-working . . . .
Brick, clay, glass . . . .
Flour . . . .
Food processing . . . .
Textiles, clothing, leather, rubber ,. . . .
Electricity generation . . . .
Fuel and light . . . .
Other* . . . .
Construction . . . .
Handicrafts ,. . . .
Trade, transport, communications ,. . . .
Public and private services ,. . ,. .
Housing ,. . ,. .
GDP ,. . ,. .
Notes: * Includes wood-working, paper-making, printing, chemicals, misc. # Included
under electrical engineering.
Sources: See text.
results. First, Gross’s observations do not lend themselves to any measure-
ment over time since the underlying original (census and survey) data were
generated by using different methods and gathered unsystematically relative
to the business cycle (Komlos ; cf. Huertas ). Some of the dates of
the estimates are closer to troughs while others are closer to peaks and,
therefore, growth rates cannot be calculated properly. Second, the examin-
ation of the composite’s sub-series reveals that Rudolph’s index is biased in
a different way. The main problem here is that the Hungarian trade statis-
tics have not been used to isolate Austria’s share in the Habsburg Empire’s
foreign trade and constant coefficients have been used instead. Moreover,
the substantial internal trade between the two halves of the empire is not
taken into account. As a result, the actual consumption of industrial input
materials is seriously misrepresented by most of the sub-series. Rudolph’s
index and Kausel’s derivative, first, overestimate the rate of industrial
growth between  and , and, second, mask important variations over
the business cycles. This is what a comparison with both the new industrial
output estimates presented here and Komlos’s indices would suggest.
In order to gauge the extent of the bias thus introduced into Kausel’s
GDP estimates, Table  compares trend growth rates of the new estimates
with those of both the original and adjusted versions of the Kausel data.
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Table . Trend rates of growth, GDP per capita (per cent per annum).
Imperial Austria Imperial Hungary
New estimate Kausel Kausel Kausel New estimate
A A
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
bound bound Bound Bound
– . . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . . .
Notes: Kausel A: Kausel estimate adjusted, using Komlos’s industrial output index;
Kausel A: Kausel estimate adjusted, using new industrial output index (Table A);
Lower, upper bounds: % confidence interval.
Sources: Appendix, Tables A, A; Kausel (), Komlos (: Table E).
 Komlos () offers a detailed critique of the Rudolph index. For a discussion of
Rudolph’s treatment of the engineering sector, see Schulze ().
 Fitted log-linear trend, using OLS. For the new estimates for Austria (–), the
results of the Chow predictive failure and structural stability tests are significant at the 
and  per cent levels respectively, suggesting a structural break in trend growth in the
early to mid-s. For Hungary, the structural stability test also points in this direction
(significant at the  per cent level). Hence fitting a linear trend over the whole period
under review may not be particularly useful.
The two sub-periods – and – have been chosen in accor-
dance with the literature which, conventionally, views the early to mid-
s as marking the end of the Great Depression in Austria. Kausel’s level
estimates have been adjusted by keeping his original  sectoral value-
added shares unchanged, but substituting Komlos’s () index of
mining, manufacturing and construction and, alternatively, the new esti-
mate of industrial production for his industrial output series. Table 
(Kausel A) shows that using Komlos’s index leads to a reduction in the
overall rate of growth and, perhaps more significantly, to a widening of the
growth differential between the two sub-periods. These effects are even
more pronounced when the new industrial output estimates are used for
adjustment rather than those of Komlos (Table , Kausel A). In terms of
growth, the Kausel estimates so adjusted hardly differ from the new GDP
per capita estimates, displaying a large growth gap of about . of a per-
centage point between the – and – periods.
For Hungary, the timing of economic expansion seems to mirror the
Austrian experience in reverse. Trend growth was much faster during
– than it was in the following years to  (Table ). This growth
differential and the lower rate of growth over the whole period contrast with
Good and Ma (). It should be emphasised that adjusting the new GDP
estimates for Hungary by replacing the new secondary sector estimates with
the Komlos industrial output index, in a fashion identical to the adjust-
ments of the Kausel estimates, makes no material difference to this finding.
The main message of Table  is, therefore, that both the timing and the
rates of per capita income growth in the Habsburg Empire were markedly
different from what earlier estimates suggested.
Table  shows that in Austria all major sectors of the economy grew more
rapidly after the mid-s than before. The growth differential, though,
was widest in the secondary sector (including mining). In Hungary, on the
other hand, the pattern was more complex. Here it was agriculture that
decelerated more strongly than industry, whilst growth in services even
increased after . In both halves of the empire, however, the secondary
sector was by a significant margin the fastest growing sector over each of the
two sub-periods. As a result, its share in constant price GDP increased from
 per cent () to  per cent () in Austria, and from about  to 
per cent in Hungary (Tables A, A).
Virtually all of the difference between Kausel and the new GDP estimates
 European Review of Economic History
 Building on Waizner’s () work, Kausel’s ()  gross value-added shares are as
follows: () agriculture, forestry: .; () mining, manufacturing, crafts, construction:
.; () trade, transport: .; () public and personal services: .; () housing:
.. These shares are, overall, fairly close to those used in the new estimates (see Table
).
 The trend growth rates of GDP per capita so adjusted are: (a) –, . per cent;
(b) –, . per cent; (c) –, . per cent per annum.
is down to the different treatment of the secondary sector. However, the
new estimates also express a more pronounced temporal pattern of output
expansion in the secondary sector than the Komlos () production
indices. The overall rate of Austrian industrial growth was practically equal
to that estimated by Komlos, but the growth gap between the sub-periods
before and after  was much wider (Table ). For Hungary, the new esti-
mates indicate a higher rate of industrial expansion for – and the
two sub-periods (Table ). Both estimates agree, however, on the sharp
deceleration after the mid-s.
These differences result from the inclusion of additional output series not
covered in the Komlos indices, from revisions in series such as iron and tex-
tiles, and from the different weighting of industrial branches in the aggre-
gate. The Komlos overall index is calculated as the unweighted sum of value
added in individual industrial sectors, measured in constant prices.
However, weighting is introduced implicitly by the  relative prices with
which the sub-series have been combined. Given that the sub-series of the
index do not span the full range of industrial sectors, this kind of implicit
weighting leads to different results than the explicit weighting adopted here.
First, handicrafts production, which in  accounted for more than a fifth
of total secondary sector output in both Austria and Hungary (Table ), is
not included in the Komlos estimates. Second, construction, constituting
about  and  per cent of Austrian and Hungarian value added in the sec-
ondary sector (Table ), is represented in the Komlos index only by railway
building and maintenance. In contrast, the new estimates (especially for
Austria) also comprise road and waterway construction, a proxy for com-
mercial investment in buildings and a series for residential construction (see
Appendix). Third, the Komlos manufacturing series includes eight sub-
series (beer, sugar, spirits, iron, flour, woollen textiles, cotton textiles, elec-
tricity), while the new estimates build on about double that number. The
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 This is confirmed by substituting the new agricultural output index for Kausel’s series
which has no effect on GDP per capita growth. Both the new estimates and Kausel rely
largely on Sandgruber () for the computation of output in agriculture and forestry.
Table . Annual growth by sector (per cent).
Austria Hungary
Primary Secondary Tertiary GDP Primary Secondary Tertiary GDP
– . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . .
Note: Peak-to-peak measurement. Since the peaks in the individual series do not
correspond exactly with one another, the periods of measurement are not always identical.
Sources: Appendix, Tables A, A.
weights of each of these eight branch series in the aggregate of the new
manufacturing series are accordingly lower. Fourth, among the new
additional output series are some, such as the engineering branches, which
display a particularly high degree of responsiveness to variations in aggre-
gate economic activity.
Tables  to  illustrate the relative extent to which differences between
Komlos and the new estimates for ‘industry’ are due to different weights
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Table . Shares in industrial value added, .
Austria Hungary
New estimate Komlos New estimate Komlos
Mining . . . .
Manufacturing . . . .
Handicrafts . – . –
Construction . . . .
Sources: Table ; Komlos (: Tables E, E, E, E, E)
Table . Annual growth of industrial output, Austria (per cent).
New estimate Komlos
Mining Manuf.Crafts Constr. Total Mining Manuf. Constr.Total
– . . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . . .
Note: Peak-to-peak measurement. Since the peaks in the individual series do not
correspond exactly with one another, the periods of measurement are not always identical.
Sources: See text for new estimates; Komlos (: Tables E, E).
Table . Annual growth of industrial output, Hungary (per cent).
New estimate Komlos
Mining Manuf. Crafts Constr. Total Mining Manuf. Constr. Total
– . . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . . .
– . . . . . . . . .
Note: Peak-to-peak measurement. Since the peaks in the individual series do not
correspond exactly with one another, the periods of measurement are not always identical.
Sources: See text for new estimates; Komlos (: Tables E, E).
and the different treatment of the handicrafts, construction and manufac-
turing sectors.
The first point worth noting is mining’s much lower weight in the new
estimates (Table ). Albeit from a comparatively low base, this was a sector
that, in Austria, expanded faster during the first two decades under review
than thereafter. In Hungary, there was no significant difference in the
growth of mining during the two sub-periods. The new estimates, being
based on the total of value added in the industrial sector rather than on a
sub-sample, correct for the implicit weighting bias by reducing the overall
weight of this branch in the industrial aggregate.
Second, construction is also given a more prominent weight. However, in
comparison to Komlos, the new construction indices for both halves of the
empire entail positive rates of expansion over all sub-periods, and, for
Austria, a much less pronounced growth differential between the two sub-
periods (Tables , ). Hence this treatment of the construction sector is,
if at all, biased against the view advanced here. The new construction series
are more comprehensive, as noted above, and cyclically far less volatile than
series based on railway construction alone.
Third, according to Fellner () and Waizner () the handicrafts
sector accounted for approximately one fifth of secondary sector output
(including mining) before the First World War. It is not incorporated in the
Komlos estimates. Here, a value added share weighted index of manufac-
turing and construction has been used as a proxy (see Appendix). This feeds
into an overall rate of ‘industrial’ growth in Austria that is slightly higher for
the whole period, lower for – and higher for – (Tables , ).
Finally, manufacturing assumes a lower weight in the new estimates of
industrial output than in the Komlos index (Table ). Again, this is an out-
come of explicit weighting and the fuller coverage of industries that make
up the secondary sector as a whole. Irrespectively, it is manufacturing that
primarily drives the pattern of expansion of the secondary sector and makes
for much of the difference between Komlos’s and the new estimates. The
latter cover an additional set of manufacturing branches that () expanded
fairly rapidly over the whole period and () more importantly displayed pro-
nounced growth differentials between the two sub-periods in both Austria
and Hungary. These include the engineering and metalworking industries.
The coverage of those branches, in turn, implies a reduction in the weight
accorded to other branches within manufacturing. Tables A and A 
present annual output indices for groups of related manufacturing
branches, documenting the effects of the wider coverage of the new esti-
mates. For example, Austria’s engineering sector as a whole (mechanical
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 In Tables  and , growth in Komlos’s railway construction series has been measured to
 (Austria) and  (Hungary). This leads to higher estimated growth than had the
lower  ‘peaks’ been used.
engineering, transport engineering, electrical engineering, instruments and
apparatus) expanded at . per cent per annum between  and , but
at . per cent thereafter. Hungarian engineering output, on the other hand,
increased at a higher rate before the mid-s than after, though the
growth differential was not nearly as wide as for Austria.
. Results and implications
The new GDP estimates suggest a pattern of Habsburg economic growth
that is distinctly different from that implied in earlier national product esti-
mates. First, Austria’s GDP per capita grew by only  per cent per annum
between  and  (Table ). Whilst confirming the tendency towards
downward adjustment of the Austrian growth rate during the last twenty or
so years of research, this result places Austria near the bottom of the
European growth league for the period under review (Table ). Second,
economic growth in Hungary was faster than in the western half of the
empire and this result matches with most previous estimates. In European
comparison, Hungarian per capita growth of . per cent per annum was
about mid-range. Third, for both halves of the empire the new estimates
reflect a pattern of expansion that was far from uniform over time. The
comparative growth rates presented in Tables  and  indicate that Austrian
growth in the two decades after  proceeded at a rate between . and
. of a percentage point below Kausel’s and Good and Ma’s () esti-
mates. Moreover, the increase in the rate of growth of Austrian per capita
GDP after  was not on a par with that achieved elsewhere. The post-
 period was one of incomes generally rising at higher rates than before.
The unweighted average growth rate for twelve European countries rose
from  per cent per annum for – to . per cent for – (Table
, excluding Switzerland). Finally, in contrast to previous estimates,
Hungarian GDP per capita growth decelerated after  to a rate below the
European average. This was to a considerable extent an outcome of the
sharp slow-down in agriculture after , when it was still the dominant
sector in terms of both output and employment. Service sector output even
accelerated during this period and although industrial growth was slower
than in the preceding two decades, it still continued at an annual rate of
more than  per cent to  (Table ). These results raise several questions
about the process of growth in the Habsburg Empire.
.. The pace of growth
The literature stresses the eighteenth century antecedents of nineteenth
century economic expansion in Austria (Good , Komlos ). John
Komlos () went even further and argued that the industrial revolution
in Austria began at about the same time as in Britain, though without imply-
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ing that it even spread at nearly the same rate as there. Viewed against this
background, it seems a little surprising that the late nineteenth century
Austrian economy did not display the growth characteristics of a typical
Gerschenkronian latecomer to industrialisation. However, the compara-
tively low rate of Austrian per capita GDP growth is equivalent to that
achieved in advanced economies such as Britain and Belgium, which by
 had per capita incomes about twice the level of imperial Austria. The
growth experience of economies in the south-east of the Continent makes
Austria’s record appear much less unfavourable in European comparison.
Bulgaria and Serbia, for instance, suffered actual falls in per capita output
during the late nineteenth century (Palairet ). Yet in the broad con-
text of European growth in the period this was an extreme experience and
the problem remains: if initially low levels of per capita output (or labour
productivity) entail the potential for faster growth than in the more
advanced economies (Gerschenkron , Abramovitz ), then the
question arises why the western half of the empire failed to expand at a pace
broadly commensurate with its relative GDP position. For example, the
economies of three other European countries with roughly comparable
levels of per capita GDP in , that is, Italy, Spain and Norway, grew
markedly faster during the period up to  (Table ). Using Good and
Ma’s () ‘imperial Austria/modern Austria’ ratios to make some tenta-
tive approximations of per capita output levels in the territories of modern
Austria, we might ask by the same token why the economically most
advanced part of the Habsburg Empire failed to keep pace with the expan-
sion achieved in countries such as Denmark, France and Germany, all of
which had broadly similar GDP per capita levels in . Nachum Gross
(, p.) argued that ‘long-run industrial growth in nineteenth century
Austria was not sufficiently rapid to make her economy relatively less back-
ward at the end of the period than it had been in the middle of the century’.
The new evidence on economic growth supports this assessment.
Moreover, given her dominant weight in total output of the empire, imperial
Austria’s lacklustre performance meant that the customs union’s growth
record was also poorer than that of most other European economies.
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 The magnitudes implied in Palairet’s (, pp. –) detailed reconstruction of national
product for Serbia and Bulgaria in  do not match with the results of the proxy approach.
First, according to Good and Ma (), Serbia’s per capita GDP was about  per cent
above that of Bulgaria while Palairet’s calculations suggest that it was  per cent below the
Bulgarian level. Second, Good and Ma’s estimates place Serbia right at the top of the
European growth league with a rate of . per cent per annum for  to , and
Bulgarian GDP is reported to have grown by . per cent during –. In contrast,
Palairet argues that Serbian per capita income shrank by at least . per cent per annum
between  and  and that Bulgarian per capita product is also likely to have fallen.
.. The periodicity of growth
The very low rates of per capita growth between  and , both rela-
tive to rates of expansion achieved elsewhere in Europe during this period
and relative to Austria’s post- record, are an expression of the Great
Depression that affected the western part of the Habsburg Empire after
 (März , ; Komlos ). Moreover, the distinct timing and
differential rates of Austrian and Hungarian growth are consistent with the
view that the direction of intra-empire capital flows played a crucial role in
prolonging economic stagnation in Austria after the  Vienna stock
market crash and fostering economic expansion in Hungary. Subsequent to
the crash and as a result of Austrian investors’ preferences for safe bonds,
capital left Austria for Hungary (Komlos ; cf. Pammer, ). This
outflow of capital was paralleled by a dramatic contraction in machinery
investment and low rates of industrial growth. In Hungary, on the other
hand, the inflow of Austrian funds allowed a substantial increase in invest-
ment and was instrumental in stimulating a process of rapid industrialisa-
tion (Schulze ). These trends were only reversed in the late s/early
s when capital was repatriated to Austria and industrial activity there
picked up again, coinciding with a slow-down in Hungarian growth. In con-
trast to the argument advanced in Good (, , ), the evidence
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Table . Levels of GDP per capita ( Geary-Khamis $).
   ∆ (% p.a.)
–
Imperial Austria , , , .
Imperial Hungary , , , .
Habsburg Empire , , , .
Modern Austria# , , , .
Belgium , , , .
Denmark , , , .
Finland , , , .
France , , , .
Germany , , , .
Italy , , , .
Netherlands , , , .
Norway , , , .
Spain , , , .
Sweden , , , .
Switzerland , n/a , .
UK , , , .
USSR , , , .
Note: # New estimate using Good and Ma’s () ‘imperial Austria/modern Austria’
ratios.
Sources: See text for Austria-Hungary; Maddison (, ).
on aggregate growth shows that Austria’s Great Depression was not a myth
or a phenomenon confined to price deflation, but a long-lasting slowdown
of the real economy (Table ). This finding raises the question about the
long-term impact of this depression on the pace of growth. For instance, to
what extent were the institutional and structural changes that emerged in
Austria during this period detrimental to more rapid growth subsequently?
For what looked like a relatively favourable income position in  was to
be eroded during the protracted stagnation of the s and s and, most
importantly, was not to be regained in the following decades to . By the
time of the First World War, imperial Austria’s relative income position had
deteriorated against nine of the  other countries in Table  when com-
pared with .
To some extent a better understanding of the nature of this prolonged
stagnation requires a look back to the preceding decades. To what extent
was Austria’s economic performance during the Great Depression marked
not only by a deviation from its course after, say,  but also from what
was happening before ? Unfortunately, the data at our disposal are
severely limited. There are no annual estimates of national product that
would permit a reasonably satisfactory assessment. Yet some observations
can be made nevertheless on the basis of industrial output.
During the s, there came first a sharp downturn in Austrian indus-
trial production () which was eventually followed by extremely rapid
recovery growth from . The initial contraction was first and foremost
an outcome of the cotton famine associated with the American civil war,
which led to a  per cent fall in cotton imports in . In its wake, output
in other manufacturing branches contracted too, albeit at considerably
lower rates than in the cotton industry (Liese and Schulze ). It seems
probable, however, that the available data overestimate somewhat the effect
of this exogenous shock on manufacturing output and subsequent expan-
sion. The  weight of cotton textiles in Komlos’s manufacturing index
(Komlos , Table E) is far higher ( per cent) than it would be if the
full range of manufacturing branches were covered in the index ( per
cent). These problems notwithstanding, the evidence on industrial growth
points to rapid expansion prior to , a marked slowdown thereafter and
acceleration from the mid-s. Using an index for mining, manufacturing
and construction in Austria and measuring from peak to peak, the follow-
ing average annual rates apply: –, . per cent; –, . per
cent; –, . per cent.
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 See note .
 This question is the subject matter of current research.
 Komlos (, Table E). Note that the high growth rate for – is not solely an
outcome of the boom of the late s. During – industrial output increased at a
rate of nearly  per cent per annum, i.e. at almost one percentage point above the rate
for –. 
The phasing of expansion in Hungarian industry is in line with the pat-
tern that Komlos has drawn, even if growth rates differ somewhat over indi-
vidual cycles. There was rapid growth between  and the early s, a
marked slow-down up to  and renewed vigorous growth again to the
last peak before the First World War (). As such the new estimates of
industrial output support the argument that the timing of economic growth
in Hungary was influenced not only by changes in the volume and direction
of intra-empire capital flows, but also by the related changes in government
expenditure and movements in Hungary’s terms of trade vis-à-vis Austria.
The latter improved during the s and s (causing a rise in
Hungarian real incomes), worsened from , and turned favourable again
after . The transfer of funds from Austria after  was associated with
fiscal expansion. With the repatriation of Austrian capital in the mid-s,
growth in government expenditure slowed to a rate below the increase in
taxes and government investment stagnated. From , government
expenditure grew again far faster than taxes. Though primarily funded out
of domestic resources, the associated rise in national debt growth was aug-
mented by a growing inflow of foreign capital (Komlos , pp. –).
At the aggregate level, however, the impact of these stimuli and con-
straints was less clear cut. Although GDP growth fell markedly after ,
there was no subsequent increase in the growth rate after . This was an
outcome of the performance of the rural economy. Output growth in the
primary sector decelerated heavily after  to about half a per cent per
annum. This more than compensated for the rapid expansion in industry
and the  per cent annual increase in service sector output. As it turns out,
the pattern of Hungarian growth throughout the late nineteenth century was
to a significant extent shaped by agriculture. Over the period under review,
Hungary’s economy expanded most rapidly between  and  (. per
cent per annum). Nearly  per cent of all GDP growth that occurred
during this period was a result of agriculture’s vigorous expansion (Table
). During the next cycle to , when aggregate growth declined slightly
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Table . Relative contributions to GDP growth, Hungary (per cent).
Primary Secondary Tertiary GDP GDP 
sector sector sector growth growth p.a.
– . . . . .
– . . . . .
– . . . . .
– . . . . .
Note: Measurement for all sectors from peak to peak in GDP. For each period, relative
contributions to GDP growth are computed as each sector’s growth rate weighted by that
sector’s share in GDP at the beginning of the period.
Source: Appendix, Table A.
to . per cent, the continuing rise in industrial output (over  per cent) was
counterbalanced by the rural sector’s falling contribution to GDP growth.
That rose again in the following decade when growth in GDP and industry
was at its slowest (. and . per cent, respectively), while agriculture
expanded again at a slightly higher rate. Thus, in conjunction with the
stable rate of expansion in services, agricultural growth helped to some
extent in reducing the adverse effects of the contraction in industry.
However, after , as noted above, the primary sector became a major
drag on economic growth, effectively preventing a return to the high rates
of expansion prevalent during the s and s.
In Austria, the primary sector’s relative contribution to GDP growth in
each of the four sub-periods was more limited than in the eastern half of the
empire. This reflects the rural sector’s much smaller share in national prod-
uct and lower rates of expansion than in Hungary. Only during the cycle
– did agriculture contribute more than  per cent to aggregate
growth (Table ). However, even then agricultural growth was not suffi-
ciently rapid to raise GDP growth significantly above the  per cent mark.
For this was the period when both the secondary and the tertiary sectors
were almost stagnant, expanding by less than  per cent per annum. 
During the next cycle to , sluggish expansion in the primary sector
became a severe constraint. First, it reduced the impact on GDP growth of
the industrial revival after  and of the marked rise in service sector
output. Second, slow growth in rural incomes is likely to have reduced
demand for manufactures and may have contributed to slow growth in
industry during the s. In the following cycle to , output of the pri-
mary sector rose at higher rates than before, augmenting the effects of the
industrial upsurge. However, in the last period –, when the industrial
sector and services continued to expand at almost the same rates as during
–, agriculture made no contribution to GDP growth. As in
Hungary, it was stagnation in the rural economy that led to a slowdown in
GDP growth in the last five years or so before the First World War.
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Table . Relative contributions to GDP growth, Austria (per cent).
Primary Secondary Tertiary GDP GDP 
sector sector sector growth growth p.a.
– . . . . .
– . . . . .
– . . . . .
– . . . . .
Note: Measurement for all sectors from peak to peak in GDP. For each period, relative
contributions to GDP growth are computed as each sector’s growth rate weighted by that
sector’s share in GDP at the beginning of the period.
Source: Appendix, Table A.
. Conclusions
First, the Austrian economy failed to catch up with the leaders and con-
tinued to fall behind most other European economies in terms of GDP per
capita growth. Second, the extent of the post- depression in Austria was
such that it affected not only the industrial sector but left its imprint on the
aggregate economy. Third, the broad pattern of industrial expansion in one
half of the empire coinciding with contraction in the other is also reflected
in the behaviour of national product. Fourth, despite rapid industrial
advance, the rural sector continued to dominate the pattern of growth in
Hungary into the early twentieth century. Finally, Hungary’s economy grew
at a markedly faster rate than Austria’s over the period as a whole and
ranked about mid-range in the European growth comparison.
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Appendix: Estimates of GDP – methods and sources
Agriculture
Fieldcrops, wine, vegetables. Austria (A): Index of fieldcrop and wine production
comprising  commodities (Sandgruber , Table ). Hungary (H): Index of
crop production comprising  commodities (Komlos , Tables D, D, D).
Fruit. (A), (H): Three-year moving averages of wine production based on
Sandgruber (, Table ) and Komlos (, Tables D, D).
Livestock. (A): Volume indices for meat, milk and wool production were com-
puted by interpolation between the , , , , and  benchmark
estimates produced by Sandgruber (, Tables , , ), and either extrapo-
lated to  or amended by additional data given in Fellner () and Waizner
(). The volume index of silk production is based on Sandgruber’s period aver-
ages and, for  to , on Fellner (). An index composed of the four series,
with  value added shares as weights, was then used to estimate total livestock
production. (H): Index based on Katus’s (, Table ) calculation of growth in
value added between the two benchmarks / and /.
Forestry. (A): Index of annual ‘Einschlag’ based on growth in timber stocks
(Sandgruber, , Table ). (H): Index based on Katus’s calculation of growth
between the two benchmarks / and / (including game and fisheries
which, however, account for less than  per cent of combined output in forestry,
game, fisheries).
Mining
(A), (H): Comprehensive calculations of gross value added in mining are taken from
Komlos (, Tables E, E). For Austria, these estimates encompass eight mining
products (anthracite, lignite, iron ore, silver, mercury, copper, lead, zinc), which
account forper centof thegross valueof totalminingoutput in (SHB),plus
output of crude oil and salt. The Hungarian estimates cover eleven mining products.
Manufacturing
Beer, sugar, spirits, flour. (A),(H): Four separate indices of value added in beer,
sugar, spirits, and flour production by Komlos (, Tables E, E). Trend
extrapolation for spirits –.
Tobacco. (A): The volume and value of output of tobacco products is given in the
official statistics. Thus a series of gross output in constant  prices was readily
available and converted into value added, using a proportion of  per cent (Fellner
, Waizner ). (H): Volume index based on output data from the official sta-
tistics (MSE, various issues) for – and trend extrapolation for –.
Petroleum. (A): Volume index of Austrian crude oil production derived from the
official statistics. Domestically produced crude oil accounted for between  and
 per cent of crude oil input in Austrian refineries. (H): As no adequate data are
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available it was assumed that output in this small sector (see Table ) expanded in
line with manufacturing as a whole.
Iron and steel. (A), (H): For both Austria and Hungary, the volume and value
of cast iron and pig iron production are well documented in the official statistics
(SJB, SHB, MSE). Drawing on input cost coefficients from Waizner () and
Burnham and Hoskins (), a value added proportion of  per cent was used for
smelting. The Austrian  price of pig iron was . crowns per ton and that of
cast iron . crowns. The volumes of Austrian and Hungarian steel production are
reported in Kupelwieser (), Schuster () and ÖZBH (–), while
estimates of wrought iron output were taken from Schulze (). Value added in
refining was then computed by, first, converting steel and wrought iron output into
value terms (using the  mean of plate and bar iron prices in Austria, i.e. 
crowns per ton; a  price is not available) and, second, applying a constant value
added proportion of  per cent (Komlos ). This procedure differs from
Komlos’s estimates of value added in iron and steel production mainly in its
reliance on contemporary records on the actual volume of steel and, partially,
wrought iron output. This helps avoid the tricky issues of stock variations and the
use of scrap that may affect estimates of wrought iron and steel output derived
solely from output and net imports of pig iron. In addition, the further processing
of iron and steel in the metal working industry has been estimated separately (see
below). Note that neither Fellner () nor Waizner () account for value
added in refining. The estimation equation for Austria’s value added in iron smelt-
ing and refining was:
[.*(.*Q  .*Q)]  [.**(Q Q)],
where Q is the volume of pig iron output, Q the volume of cast iron output, Q the
volume of steel output and Q the volume of wrought iron production. The estimates
for Hungary were produced in identical fashion but rely on Hungarian price data.
Mechanical engineering. (A), (H): Annual estimates of output are taken from
Schulze () where the estimation methods and sources used are set out in detail.
These estimates build on wage-sums paid in the machine-building industry and on the
volume of iron and steel inputs. Hoffmann’s steam engine price index for Germany was
revised so as to account for Austrian rather than German input prices (Hoffmann ).
This revised price index was used for deflating output in all four engineering series.
Transport engineering. (A), (H): Output in this engineering branch was estimated
as for mechanical engineering, drawing on material reproduced and sources cited in
Schulze (). For both branches, the value-added proportion was  per cent.
Electrical engineering. (A): Wage-bill data are available only for  to  and
for these years value added was calculated as for mechanical engineering. An initial
attempt to approximate value added in this ‘new’ industry by use of a series of the
number of telephones (Komlos ) was abandoned, as the growth in this series
outstripped that of the electrical engineering series by a very large margin during the
years with overlap. Using iron and steel inputs for extrapolation did not seem sen-
sible either, as a considerable proportion of output is not iron and steel intensive.
Instead, a log-linear trend was fitted to obtain values for the missing years. (H):
Index comprises the series for mechanical and transport engineering with  value
added shares as weights, as no branch-specific data are available for extrapolation.
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Instruments and apparatus. (A): Weighted index comprising the series for mech-
anical, transport and electrical engineering. The  shares in combined value
added of these branches were used as weights. (H): Index comprising the series for
mechanical and transport engineering with  value added shares as weights.
Metal-working. (A), (H): Output in this branch was calculated as for mechan-
ical engineering and transport engineering (Schulze ). The price index used is
a composite of several iron and steel input prices. The value added proportion is 
per cent. Value added in the non-ferrous metal working branch of this sector is
assumed to have grown in line with that in the iron and steel using branches.
Brick, clay, glass (construction materials). (A), (H): Weighted indices derived for
construction (see below).
Food processing. (A), (H): Weighted indices of value added in beer, sugar, spir-
its and flour milling (Komlos , Tables E, E).
Textiles and clothing. (A): Weighted index of value added in woollen, cotton and
linen textiles production. The two indices for woollen and cotton textiles are taken
from Komlos (, Table E). These have been combined with linen production
using their respective  shares in total value added as weights. Linen textiles pro-
duction was estimated in a two stage process (spinning, weaving) on the basis of
domestic flax production, net imports of flax and net imports of linen yarn. Given the
high rate of non-marketed output (Sandgruber ), it was assumed that only half
of domestically produced flax was used for commercial linen production. The value
added proportions were  per cent for both spinning and weaving (Fellner ,
Gross ). Rates of conversion from flax to yarn ( per cent for domestically pro-
duced flax fibre and  per cent for imported flax) and from yarn to cloth ( per
cent) are taken from Hoffmann (). According to the official export statistics, the
average  price of yarn was . crowns per kilogram; the price of cloth was .
crowns. The estimation equation for value added in linen spinning and weaving was:
[.*.*(.*.*Q.*Q)][.*.*.*
((.*.*Q.*Q)Q)],
where Q is the volume of domestic flax production, Q is the volume of net
imports of flax and Q the volume of net imports of yarn. (H):  weighted index
of value added in woollen and cotton textiles production (Komlos , Table E).
Leather and rubber. (A), (H): It was assumed that value added in this branch
grew in line with value added in textiles and clothing, i.e. the respective weighted
textile indices have been used.
Electricity generation. (A): Output was approximated in four stages. The
number of central power stations is available for , when the first station was
built in Austria, to  (Matis and Bachinger ) and for  to 
(Österreichisches Handelsmuseum ). For the years between  and ,
the number of generating plants was approximated by linear interpolation. Total
electricity output (in kw) and output per power station is available only for  to
 (Österreichisches, Handelsmuseum ). It was assumed that electricity
output per unit rose between  and  at the same rate as for  to .
Multiplying estimated unit output by the actual (–) and estimated
(–) number of power stations yielded annual estimates of total electricity
output for the years with missing data, which were then combined with the original
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data for  to . Finally, the output series so obtained was used to calculate
value added for  to  on the basis of the  value added/physical output
ratio. Note that this series is measured in  prices. (H): No adequate data are
available for Hungary and it was assumed that electricity output there rose at the
same rate as Austria’s.
Fuel; light; wood-working; paper-making; printing; chemicals; misc. (A), (H): No
data are available for Austria and Hungary and it was assumed that value added grew
in line with manufacturing as a whole. Note that total output in these branches
accounted for only  per cent of Austrian GDP and  per cent of total commodity
output in  ( and  per cent, respectively, for Hungary; see Table ).
Construction
(A): Weighted index that includes an infrastructure series, a series for residential
building, and a series for commercial investment in buildings (machinery produc-
tion as a proxy). The infrastructure series is composed of Komlos’s (, Table
E ) index for value added in railway construction and repair, and two new indices
for road construction and inland waterway construction which draw on official data
(annual issues of SJB and SHB). Using a proportion of  per cent, value added in
road construction was estimated for new construction and for maintenance on the
basis of road length and expenditure data. The cost of constructing one kilometre
of new road in  was approximately , crowns per year; that of maintaining
one kilometre of road was , crowns. The incomplete and inconsistent data on
the length of inland waterways necessitated to estimate value added in the con-
struction of waterways solely on the basis of public expenditure data. A new series
was obtained by deflating total annual outlays for new construction and mainten-
ance (using the general price index of Mühlpeck et al. ()) and applying a value
added proportion of  per cent. The three indices for railway, road and waterway
construction are combined using  shares in joint value added as weights.
The new series for residential construction is based on additions to the housing
stock as recorded in the censuses and adjusted for population growth to correct for
the effects of unrecorded changes in the average size of residential dwellings (annual
issues of SJB and SHB).
Finally, the infrastructure, residential and commercial building indices are com-
bined using  weights derived from Hoffmann ().
(H): No data are available on changes in the housing stock. Residential con-
struction was, therefore, estimated on the basis of population growth and the
assumption that the average number of residents per dwelling in Austria applied
also to Hungary. Data on road and waterways construction are either lacking
altogether or are incomplete and inconsistent. Hence the infrastructure series is
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 These figures are based on the average  expenditure on state roads (, crowns
per kilometre) and the assumption that the ratio between the costs of new construction
and the costs of maintenance approximated to that which applied in railway
construction (Komlos ).
 Note, however, that in  state expenditure on inland waterways accounted for less
than half the expenditure on state roads which, in turn, made up only about  per cent
of the total road network.
based solely on railway construction and repair (Komlos , E; three year
moving average to smooth the impact of the high level of volatility in railway con-
struction). As for Austria, machinery production has been used as a proxy for com-
mercial building. The three series are combined using the same weights as for
Austria.
Handicrafts
(A), (H): The share of handicrafts production in commodity output remained more or
less constant throughout the late nineteenth century (Gross , Fellner ). The
official census data would suggest, moreover, that the handicrafts sector did not lose
out to industry in terms of employment. In short, there is little evidence that the hand-
icrafts sector declined in absolute or relative terms. This resilience can be explained,
at least partly, by this sector’s shift into custom production, components making and
repair work. It was, therefore, assumed that value added in handicrafts production
expanded in line with manufacturing and construction, i.e. weighted indices of manu-
facturing and construction were used for extrapolation. The respective  shares of
manufacturing and construction in combined value added were used as weights.
Trade, transport and communications
(A): The value added series for trade and communications is taken from Kausel
(, Table ) without further adjustment. He assumed, first, that trade moved in
line with primary and secondary production and, second, that only half of agricul-
tural output was traded. Kausel used data from Bachinger () to approximate
output of rail and road transport, of shipping and of the postal system. (H): weighted
index of output in transport and communication and output in trade. The index of
output in transport and communication is taken from Katus (, Table ), while
the trade series is based on the annual average rate of growth between Katus’s (,
Tables , ) benchmark estimates for  and .  value added shares have
been used as weights (. for transport and communication, . for trade).
Services
(A): Value added in ‘productive’ (private and public) and ‘personal’ services has
been estimated by Kausel (, Table ) on the basis of official employment sta-
tistics. His series is incorporated into the GDP estimates without further adjust-
ment. (H): Fellner’s () estimates of incomes generated in services are
inconsistent and a comparison with Kausel () would suggest that his figures for
Austria seriously underestimate service sector output. Hence they have not been
used here. As a first step, the  level of the labour force in public and private
services was estimated using the data provided in Katus (, Tables , ). It
was then assumed that the  ratio of Hungarian to Austrian output per worker
in trade, transport and communications (Katus , Table ; Kausel ,
Tables , , ) prevailed also in private and public services. Applying this ratio to
Austrian labour productivity in services yielded an approximation of the level of
Hungarian service output for . Finally, this was extrapolated using the trend
rate of growth of Austrian service sector output for –.
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Housing
(A): Kausel (, Table ) estimated rental income from housing for  to 
using the total number of residents’ parties and assuming a constant size and qual-
ity of the dwellings, while taking account of owner-occupation. Again, no attempt
at further adjustment has been made before integrating this series into the GDP
estimates. (H): Drawing on housing tax records, Fellner () estimated rental
income as a proportion of the capital value of residential dwellings in the Habsburg
Empire. Kausel’s computations for Austria (and comparisons with other
economies) would suggest that Fellner’s data and procedure underestimate the
actual level of rental incomes by a large margin. Here an approximation was made
by, first, calculating the average  ‘rent per head’ of population in Austria. Then
the income differential between the two economies was taken into account by com-
puting the ratio of Hungarian to Austrian total output of commodities and trade
and communications per capita (as proxy for average income). Applying this ratio
to the Austrian figure of ‘rent per head’ yielded an approximation of the respective
Hungarian ‘rent per head’ which was, finally, extrapolated by the index of popu-
lation.
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Table A. Austrian GDP in constant  prices (m. Crowns).
Primary Secondary Tertiary GDP
sectora sectorb sectorc GDP per capita
Crowns 
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
Notes: a Agriculture; forestry. b Manufacturing; mining; handicrafts; construction. c Trade,
transport, communications; public and private services; housing.
Sources: See text.
Table A. Hungarian GDP in constant  prices (m. Crowns).
Primary Secondary Tertiary GDP GDP per capita
sectora sectorb sectorc
Crowns   
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
 . . . . . .
Notes: a Agriculture; forestry. b Manufacturing; mining; handicrafts; construction. c Trade,
transport, communications; public and private services; housing.
Sources: See text.
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Table A. Indices of manufacturing production in Austria ( prices,
  ).
Food Iron Engin. Metalw. Energy Textiles Constr. Total
mats.
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . .
Notes: Food: weighted index of beer, sugar, tobacco, spirits, flour, and other food-processing; Iron:
weighted index of iron smelting and refining; Engineering: weighted index of mechanical engineering,
transport engineering, electrical engineering, instruments and apparatus; Metalworking: index of
ferrous metalworking; Energy: weighted index of petroleum, electricity generation, fuel and light;
Textiles: weighted index of cotton, woollen, linen textiles; Construction materials: weighted
construction index; Total: includes also residual other manufacturing not listed separately.
Sources: See text.
Table A. Indices of manufacturing production in Hungary (
prices,   ).
Food Iron Engin. Metalw. Textiles Const. Total
Mats.
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . ., . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . .
Notes: Food: weighted index of beer, sugar, tobacco, spirits, flour, and other food-
processing; Iron: weighted index of iron smelting and refining; Engineering: weighted index
of mechanical engineering, transport engineering, electrical engineering, instruments and
apparatus; Metalworking: index of ferrous metalworking; Textiles: weighted index of cotton
and woollen textiles; Construction materials: weighted construction index; Total: includes
also electricity generation and residual other manufacturing not listed separately.
Sources: See text.
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